Indian Air Force, Cracking Under
Media Pressure
By
Pravin Sawhney
THE
NEWS IS that the Indian Air Force is cracking under pressure.
Not from an enemy, but from an ever inquisitive media. First,
it was the regular MiG-21 crashes which earned the aircraft the
sobriquet of "flying coffins", courtesy the media. So
much so, that Defence Minister George Fernandes had to take a
flight himself in the aircraft to inform the media that it was
uninformed.
However, the respite turned out to be brief. Just when the IAF
was celebrating the coming of Hawks, which would improve the training
of young pilots, news broke that things were wrong with the SU-30
aircraft. The Hindu reported of excessive nicks in the engine
blades. This meant a material defect, and a need to change the
blades regularly as they would otherwise put an unwanted strain
on the compressor. Another newspaper spoke of defects in the engines.
The Air Force, of course, denied all this. What, however, it could
not keep under wraps was that the Air Force Chief himself was
stressed and under pressure.
This was more than evident when the Force team arrived at the
Air Headquarters at the appointed hour on Monday to interview
the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy.
In line with the services' protocol, the questionnaire was sent
well in advance for the information of the Air Force Chief. Strangely,
his staff could not reach their boss before we did. We, however,
gave our copy of the questionnaire to the ACM for last minute
reading. As he read the questions (which obviously dealt with
the SU-30), we prepared for an extensive interview.
The
ACM obviously had other ideas. Muttering under his breath, he
threw the questionnaire on the table. He could not answer illiterate
questions, he said, adding that the media was cynical and could
see no good in the Air Force. His stern demeanor indicated that
the interview was over before it started. There was silence in
the room. Within minutes, we composed ourselves and started putting
away our stuff to leave when suddenly the Air Force Chief had
a change of mind.
For
the next 40 minutes or so, he spoke on a range of issues concerning
the Air Force. What troubled us was why media enquiries about
the SU-30 aircraft had visibly upset him. The media, after all,
has a right to ask in order to inform the taxpayers how their
money has been spent. Moreover, the SU-30 aircraft deal has been
an unusual one, its purchase was both sudden and unexpected.
The Sukhoi offer has a history. The SU-27 was offered in 1991.
In December 1993, the latest versions were offered for evaluation
in India, but the IAF showed little interest. A few months before
India suddenly bought these aircraft in early 1995, a modified
export version of SU-27PU, designated SU-30MK was offered, but
the IAF again showed no keenness since its priorities were the
Advanced Jet Trainers and MiG-21 upgrades. This writer, therefore,
spoke with the former Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal SK Kaul,
the man who cleared the SU-30 deal for the IAF, to know why this
aircraft was suddenly found acceptable.
According to ACM Kaul, the initial deal was for a total of 40
SU-30s only. Eight SU-30K were to be procured immediately, and
32 aircrafts were to be the 'MKI' version. The latter was still
under development, and unlike the 'K' version (an air defence
aircraft), the 'MKI' is a multi-role aircraft. The need for 'K'
version was to familiarize pilots with the aircraft, so that the
transition to the heavier and sophisticated 'MKI' version would
be smoother.
The
'K' version is about 29 tonne as compared with the 36 tonne SU-30MKI.
The reasons, according to ACM Kaul, which settled the deal in
favor of SU-30 over the Mirage-2000 (India has two squadrons of
this multi-role French aircraft) were costs and capabilities.
Each Mirage-2000 was costing Rs 140 crore against Rs 100 crore
for SU-30. Moreover, the SU-30 has more range, payload and stand-off
weapons than Mirage-2000.
ACM
Kaul, who has been Air Advisor in the Indian Embassy in Moscow
in 1980s, however, conceded: "The Soviets, and the follow-on
Russians are weak in materials and their engines do not last as
long as those made in the Western countries." Strangely,
the initial deal was reworked to help the Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited as well. Instead of two squadrons, it was decided that
100 additional SU-30MKI aircraft would be produced in India by
HAL. ACM Kaul said that as nothing less than eight to ten squadrons
would have made the setting up of the SU-30 aircraft production
line at HAL cost-effective, the Government got the IAF to raise
its SU-30 requirement.
However, the current Air Force Chief gave a different story. According
to ACM Krishnaswamy, the original SU-30 deal was for 50 aircraft,
eight 'K' versions and 42 'MKI' version, which has vector thrust
technology, something the US does not have. Meanwhile, there were
intense deliberations for nearly a year between India and Russia
about what avionics, weapon loads and so on India wanted on the
'MKI' version. Once these were decided India started getting the
'MKI' version from Russia. "There were no plans to acquire
more Mirage-2000," he said.
The plans for the remaining 140 (and not 100 as told by ACM Kaul)
SU-30MKI which are to be made at HAL are evolving. Considering
that technology is growing each day, India does not want to produce
the same SU-30MKIs. In close consultation with the Russians, it
is looking at improving the SU-30MKIs. Improving should not be
confused with up gradation.
The
latter essentially means that some parts of the aircraft are taken
out and replaced by new and better ones. On the other hand, improving
an aircraft implies that changes are brought about on the production
line itself. For example, according to ACM Krishnaswamy, India
is good at composite technology, which would suggest that future
aircraft could be lighter and hence carry more pay load, and their
reliability would enhance. These are the things India is discussing
with the Russians and they are being very cooperative, the ACM
said.
Regarding the recent problems in SU-30 as suggested by the media,
the Air Force Chief said the aircraft were perfectly fine. "There
are no problems and the SU-30 is a good aircraft." But why
should the media fabricate things? "There are vested interests
that are unhappy with the deal. I cannot name them," he muttered.
Be that as it may, the issue is that instead of transparency and
more openness with the media, why is the IAF unnerved by reports
on the SU-30? Are there some skeletons in the cupboard that it
wants to hide?
The
writer is the editor of newsmagazine, Force
