"Afghanistan
is still a fragile country"
Mohammad
Shehzad
Imtiaz
Gul, a Pashtun by origin, has been covering Afghanistan since1990
for the Voice of Germany. He has compiled his Afghanistan experience
in a book, The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan relations under the Taliban,
which provides a mine of information on Pakistan’s foreign
policy towards Afghanistan right from the beginning till the fall
of the Taliban and establishment of an interim government in Kabul
in the wake of the Bonn Agreement. 
Of
numerous conclusions emerging from the book, one of them is, it
was Pakistan’s persecution complex, i.e. threat to Islam and
Pakistan from the former USSR, Afghanistan and India, which condemned
Pakistan, first of all to become the US foot-soldier in its proxy
war against Moscow and afterwards to keep on playing a dirty game
in search of “strategic depth” in Pakistan.
September
11 has brought unimaginable changes in the world politics. It provided
the US the justification to attack Afghanistan and dismantle the
Taliban. To what extent Afghanistan has become a peaceful country;
to what extent its people have been emancipated from the Taliban’s
atrocious rule, and to what extent they are thankful to the Americans
for this “deliverance”, Gul speaks to Mohammad Shehzad
to answer this in this exclusive interview for South Asia Tribune.
According
to some analysts, the US had made a decision to annihilate the Taliban
a week before 9/11. To what extent this assertion is true?
In connection of my book The Unholy Nexus, I had
a number of meetings with Mulla Zaeef at his Islamabad residence
shortly before he was deported and then picked up by the FBI agents
across the Torkham gate. He told me personally in detail how a Taliban
lobbyist in Washington, a relative of the king, prompted him to
talk via satellite phone to Zalmay Khalilzad on Sept 5. I asked
him for a face-saving mechanism out of the OBL imbroglio. “No!”
was Khalilzad's response. “We want him at all costs, without
conditions.” That was just a waste of a 20-minute expensive
sat-phone call, Zaeef said. An article in the Washington Post in
August 2001 by former security advisor Oliver North had also made
the same point—urging the administration that bin Laden has
declared war on the US and he should be paid back in the same way.
This makes quite clear that the administration had made up plans
to take out the Taliban and their guest before the 9/11.
Nearly
a year after the American initiative in Afghanistan, how has the
country changed from the time the Taliban were in power?
It is still a very fragile country—desperately
looking for the realization of the much-needed aid for reconstruction
and the rehabilitation of state institutions. It has changed in
terms of conditions for schools, women, and a bit of reconstruction.
Politically, nothing has changed in the presence of a president
dependent for his security on the US commandos, a president who
is hostage to the ministry of defense, interior and foreign affairs
that is being run by the Panjsheris. Dostum, Ismail Khan, Karim
Khalili and Yununs Qanooni are still running their fiefdoms, with
UN envoy Brahimi issuing SOS calls, saying that Afghanistan urgently
needed funds for reconstruction and not the war. This means Afghanistan
remains debatably stable as long as the Americans are around, although
even now travel outside Kabul is not devoid of risks.
Liberation
of women was an important rhetorical justification for Washington's
initiative. Has their lot changed significantly?
It
was just one of the many sticks the West was wielding to ostracize
the Taliban, a ruse that was implied to paint the Taliban as the
vandals or barbarians of the worst kind, though the West conveniently
ignored what happens even now to women in the Saudi Kingdom. Robert
Fisk of the Independent had called it the height of the western
bigotry just because the Taliban had no petro-wealth.
There is a view which holds that warlordism was
suppressed under the Taliban, that they managed to restore a semblance
of order. Do you think that warlordism is back, that it perhaps
has become endemic?
Warlordism is back in full force, though operating
in a muffled way because of the scare the Americans have spread
across the country. They are lying low, and will do so until they
see Americans signing out. Karzai government doesn't have any writ
outside Kabul at all. For instance, Iranians are still propping
up Ismail Khan, of whom the Americans are wary. This means the cat
and mouse between Kabul and Herat will continue. Gul Agha Sherzai
in Kandahar remains a southerner, to quote another example.
Another debilitating factor is the phenomenal rise
in banditry, which has turned parts of Afghanistan into virtual
no-go areas for relief workers, and even for the government officials.
Various NGOs and UN agencies, for instance, have reported dozens
of gunpoint attacks and harassment in the months after the Loya
Jirga, which reflects the non-existing control of the center over
other regions. Even the UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi had to admit recently
that security had deteriorated seriously in recent months. This
has also alarmed even the Americans who have meanwhile sounded out
their willingness to extend the UN peacekeeping operations into
the provinces as well. That speaks for the security conditions inside
Afghanistan, and also makes many Afghans nostalgic about the Taliban.
We personally travelled long distances during the Taliban days—the16-hour
bone-jarring travel from Kandahar to Kabul, the 12-hour arduous
journey from Herat to Kandahar and from Torkham to Kabul, even to
Bamiyan. Not a single time did anybody come our way for money or
any other ulterior motive.
Has
the lot of minorities improved? Do you see them, particularly the
Hindus, returning to Afghanistan?
The money market in Kabul, predominantly run by
the Hindus and the Sikhs, is bustling with trade again. Most of
them had settled down in Jalalabad after a disastrous blaze at the
Sarai Shehzad in 1996-1997, but most people, at least the earning
heads, are going back, though not everybody is safe and there are
frequent incidents of robberies.
What
is the nature of resentment among the Pashtuns at the institutional
arrangement existing in Kabul?
Lack of real representation at the highest level!
With Haji Qadeer gone, you hardly have real Pashtun representative
in the government, which is practically dominated by the non-Pashtuns,
and as a result the Pashtun Afghans in ministries and even in public
life now live in scare of victimization or discrimination—just
as the non-Pashtun bureaucracy in big eastern and southern towns
suffered during the Taliban regime. Just to avoid discrimination,
Pashtuns have again begun to converse consciously in Dari (Afghan
Persian), something we witnessed under the Taliban, when Tajiks,
Hazara, and Uzbeks took pains to learn Pashto to be able to talk
to those calling the shots.
This again is very dangerous because this means
continuation of the intrigues to outdo the rivals. The direct victim
of this tussle are the poor people who wonder whether the facade
of peace will survive the intense politicking, more is the Pashtun
population because they are not sure how they will be treated.
Why
Hamid Karzai and General Fahim are at loggerheads? What could be
its consequences?
It is very simple—both are fighting for a
political territory; with Karzai being propped up by the US commandos,
and Fahim and his people trying to regain full control over government
affairs. Fahim's Northern Alliance is already holding on to all
key ministries, but they feel insecure as long as the Americans
are backing Karzai.
How
do you assess Karzai's performance? Do you think his stint is more
an instance of show dominating substance?
Karzai so far has found himself helpless in the
presence of the strong Northern Alliance representatives. He is
so worried about his security that he refused to turn up at a ceremony
of the National Police Academy, which he was supposed to inaugurate
after renovation. Karzai became controversial from the day one as
an American tool, whom the Pentagon facilitated for dozens of his
trips abroad during the initial months after the Bonn Agreement.
In a way, he was looked upon as an American show-boy. He himself
does not have a big constituency. He is neither late Abdul Haq,
nor a Hikmetyar, or Ahmed Shah Masood or Rabbani. He doesn't have
an ideological pull and, therefore, will remain a weak pawn in the
hands of the Americans as well as a subordinate to the real power-wielders
i.e. the Northern Alliance.
Do
you think the situation in Afghanistan would have been different
had foreign troops been deployed beyond Kabul?
Things would have been much better; I am sure, had
the US been wiser and supported the idea of a force of 25,000 to
30,000 as the UN envoy Brahimi also demanded several times. Such
a force would have created a big deterrent outside Kabul—at
least on major commercial routes and business centers.
Strategists like General Hameed Gul say that the
Taliban will regroup. Russian and China will support them and a
guerilla war will start in Afghanistan. Does such notions hold any
water?
It is quite possible because the international political
expediency knows no morality! Just look at the Russians, they are
going ahead with the nuclear plant for Iran. They are also continuing
their defense cooperation with the Iranians—both to the displeasure
of the Americans. China must be disturbed over the construction
of a big US airbase outside Biskek, Kirgystan, where more than 6,000
US marines, air force personnel and support staff have been stationed.
That is just like being at the back of the Chinese as well as near
the Russians—the best proximity for keeping a watch on both
nations. The presence of the US at Jacobabad and a couple of other
small bases along the Arabian Sea (on the Pakistani soil) is also
disturbing for Iran, China and Russia. Now, keeping all this in
view, resistance—regardless of whether they are Taliban or
Al-Qaeda—to the presence of US and western troops cannot be
ruled out. The Gwadar coastal highway is another concern to China,
and that is why it has offered a lot of technical assistance for
the construction of this highway—meaning sneaking in quietly
to reinforce its role for future.
Once the Americans become too pre-occupied with
Iraq and are forced to disengage partially from Afghanistan, the
opposition will resurge very quickly because the Afghan army itself
will not be able to contain such movement. This could turn Afghanistan
again into a hot caldron, a battlefield for all the powers including
India.
Is
Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan over? What have been the India's
gains?
For the time being, Pakistanis are really lying
low, trying to mend fences, remove the misgivings because nobody
in Kabul believes or trusts them. Pakistani diplomats are in fact
very, very cautious while talking on phones. It is just like revisiting
the pre-mujahideen era when the Pakistani diplomats would live like
island people, surrounded by intelligence thugs both in and outside
the embassy and their homes, as well as under siege and surveillance
by the ministry of interior and communications.
But if an opposition to Karzai and to the US forces
surfaced, this could lure the Pakistani establishment to link up
with the dissenting voices to offset the growing Indian influence
in Kabul. One must keep in mind that if Pakistanis can play it neat
and clean, restore their confidence, there is no way the Indian
influence, which is largely restricted to the non-Pashtun Afghanistan,
can outdo that of Pakistan. The geographical proximity and ethnic
affinity is Pakistan's biggest advantage, but if the establishment
plays the old tricks, it is not going to get anywhere.
As far the Indian influence, they have access to
the Afghan police training programs, they have donated three airbuses,
albeit used ones, to the Ariana Airlines. The Indians are also offering
services for banking and services sector reforms. And that means
a lot. In fact an old Pakistan-veteran, Viviek Katju, who also negotiated
the release of the Indian Airlines 814 aircraft at Kandahar, is
now the ambassador to Kabul. This all also underlines the sense
of urgency among the Indian establishment to regain the territory
it lost during the Taliban regime.
Do
Afghans feel obliged to the US, or is there a simmering discontent
against them?
Why should the Afghans feel obliged to the US or
for that matter any other country like Pakistan, which is still
hosting more than 1.5 million refugees, and suffering the aftermath
of almost four million refugees through the 90s, and Iran, which
also hosted more than three million Afghans. The Afghans in general
believe they are the victim of the selfish, self-serving international
politics of expedience. For them, the Americans are as bad as the
Russians. The Russians destroyed the peace of their country, the
Americans created the mujahideen who then branched out into Taliban,
and thus prompted Iran, Moscow and New Delhi to support the Northern
Alliance and Pakistan leaning heavily towards the Taliban. There
is a general feeling as we found out across Afghanistan, that every
country moved out of self-interest, and cared little for the poor
Afghans, who found in almost four years of drought yet an additional
enemy.
There
are reports in the press that Pakistani Taliban have been transported
to India so that the latter could use them to give currency to the
`cross-border terrorism’. To what extent such stories are
true?
Dr Abdullah Abdullah, the foreign minister, denied
this categorically. And there is little independent information
on this. But one must keep in mind the presence of Mr Katju, the
Indian ambassador in Kabul, who negotiated the release of the hijacked
Indian airliner at Kandahar. Also, the Indians have mounted pressure
and persuaded the United States to interrogate Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil,
the Taliban foreign minister who had brokered the hijackers-Indian
talks at Kandahar. These should all be very alarming signs for the
Pakistani establishment which is believed to have had a close nexus
with those released and their liberators. The presence of Ahmed
Omar Sheikh, convicted for Daniel Pearl murder, Mushtaq Zargar (both
released along with Maulana Azhar Masood) was an indirect proof
to this relationship.
How
has the American presence impacted on the oil game?
The Americans have secured almost permanent bases
and if they don’t pull out under the pretext of the war on
Iraq, one could presume that they will pave for the American oil
giants to return to the region. The US would still like to undermine
the Iranian oil in the region, that can happen only if oil starts
to flow from the Turkmen and Kazakh oil fields. That is feasible
only through Afghanistan to Pakistan. It is at least America's political
gain if this oil and gas could be piped through Afghanistan. For
that, stability has to be ensured and that pre-requisites the presence
of big international force. Let us see when that force comes into
action.
Without
an expanded international force, and without a truly professional
national and police force, Afghanistan can never return to stability.
Even if it does, it will take years. And here the international
community comes into play, which at the moment is throwing its money
into expensive computers and vehicles for the new administration
but little into the roads that rattle down these vehicles within
months. Reconstruction of not a single major artery linking the
north with the south or the south with the east and west has begun.
It is here that the international community needs to dole out money
and engage armies of jobless people to a) repair the infrastructure
that is eating away resources of the people and b) provide employment
and wean people away from gun-totting and banditry.
Have
the Afghan leaders learnt from the mistakes of the past. To what
extent are they serious in burying the hatchet and work for the
betterment of their country and people?
The
Afghans are hard to tame—self-asserting, egoistic people,
who can back down temporarily out of expediency, but not resign
altogether. It is very difficult to beat this mindset, and we are
talking of people whom the circumstances and greed—unqualified
support of the Americans in the early 80s, money and material by
the Iranians and Russians, and again unconditional American tutelage
for its war on terror—have hard-cast into this mindset. What
the international community needs for years to come is to engage
and promote younger people—unstinted by the dirty political
and military games, and at the same time whittle down the older
warlords through indirect arm-twisting and through continued presence
of the forces. There seems to be no way around this strategy, I
am afraid!
Mohammad Shehzad is a freelance journalist based in Islamabad. Email:
rageshri2@yahoo.com
