Vajpayee's China
visit: a Himalayan deal?
C. Raja Mohan
AS
INDIAN and Chinese officials try to finalise the plans for the
long overdue visit of Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, to
Beijing, a few questions immediately come to mind. What kind of
a visit must Mr. Vajpayee undertake? A feel-good summit with the
old and new Chinese leaders, or a substantive one that grapples
with key bilateral problems at hand?
Mr.
Vajpayee's visit will be the first by an Indian Prime Minister
to China in nearly a decade. The last such trip was by P.V. Narasimha
Rao in September 1993. Prior to that Rajiv Gandhi undertook a
historic mission to Beijing in December 1988 to normalise relations
with China. From the Chinese side, the highest level visit to
India was by the President, Jiang Zemin, in November 1996.
There
is indeed a good case to make exchanges at this level more frequent.
It is deplorable that only three such visits have taken place
in nearly a decade and a half between the world's two largest
countries and neighbours. To have annual visits by the top leaders
must indeed be one of the decisions from Mr. Vajpayee's visit.
However, since the Prime Minister is travelling to Beijing after
so long, there must be a lot more coming out of the visit. But
there might be too little time before the visit and the problems
between the two nations are far too many to expect substantive
outcomes in the next few weeks.
Yet,
it is possible for Mr. Vajpayee and his Chinese interlocutors
to come up with one big idea that could drive bilateral relations
forward in the coming years.
Here
is a simple proposition: let India and China declare their national
commitment to transform the Himalayas from the political barrier
they are today into a passage between the two great civilisations.
To avoid it from becoming an empty slogan, the two leaders must
give decisive instructions to their bureaucracies to sort out
in quick time the many difficulties that stand in the way of making
the Himalayas a bridge between the two large markets.
It
does not take long to recognise that many of the long-standing
problems between the two nations are centred round the Himalayas
? these include the boundary dispute, misperceptions on Tibet
and China's non-recognition of Sikkim as a part of India.
At
another level, both sides nurse huge political grievances that
each one's right to operate across the Himalayas has been severely
curtailed by the other.
India
is deeply concerned that its traditional cultural and trading
links with Tibet have snapped under Chinese control. China, on
the other hand, believes that India actively prevents it from
establishing full relationship with the kingdoms on the southern
side of the Himalayas, such as Nepal and Bhutan. Deepening this
sense of injury has been the proclaimed loss of territories as
well as the notions of "buffer states" and "spheres
of influence".
The
rivalry of the last four decades has resulted in attaching undue
importance to these concepts inherited from the imperial age.
The ideas on buffer states, spheres of influence and the insulation
of national spaces from interaction with the neighbours have little
meaning in this age of globalisation. No nation can be kept out
of key areas in its own neighbourhood in the modern world in the
name of high principle or a perception of historic injustices.
At
a time when both India and China are adapting to the logic of
trade flows and movements of people across borders, it makes little
sense to keep the Himalayas in a state of permanent political
tension. The time is now for India and China to begin the transformation
of the geopolitics of the Himalayan region from confrontation
to cooperation.
The
easiest place to start would be Sikkim. There is little justification
in China withholding a recognition of Sikkim as a part of India
and showing the Indian State as an independent entity. An unwillingness
to move forward on Sikkim only deepens the Indian suspicion of
Chinese intentions on the key question of India's territorial
integrity.
An
explicit and unambiguous Chinese recognition in whatever form
would allow India to reopen Sikkim to trade with China through
Tibet. Restoration of trade links would also involve the reopening
of the historic silk road that runs between Sikkim and Tibet through
the Natu La pass. The establishment of trade offices and the facilitation
of travel in larger numbers by tourists, pilgrims and businessmen
across the Himalayan divide would follow. Renewal of trading across
the Himalayas would fit in nicely with the developmental needs
of both Tibet and Sikkim. As part of its strategy of globalising
Tibet, China is actively seeking to forge economic links between
Tibet and its neighbouring regions. It is seeking foreign investment
and tourist flows to boost the economic prosperity of Tibet.
This
provides a huge opportunity for India to restore its historic
ties with Tibet, not as a matter of legal right but as a practical
outcome of expanding trade and people-to-people contact.
On
the political questions relating to Tibet, the outlook is promising.
Contacts have been re-established between Beijing and the Dalai
Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan people exiled in India for
more than four decades.
All
indications are that China is likely to begin talks with the Dalai
Lama's representatives in the near future. India, which has long
acknowledged that Tibet is an autonomous part of China, has a
strong interest in an early settlement of the issue and the return
of Tibetan refugees back home.
On
Bhutan, India should not be seen as obstructing the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Thimpu and Beijing. China argues
that Bhutan is the only nation in the region with which it has
no formal relationship. New Delhi, at the official level, says
it is up to Bhutan, which has been generally cautious about international
relations, to decide on this issue. In the long run, India cannot
stop Bhutan from establishing diplomatic ties with China. Nor
is it worth trying.
On
the boundary issue, the Vajpayee Government asked and got the
Chinese to agree to a faster pace in the talks on delineating
the Line of Actual Control on their long and contested border.
After
the successful exchange of maps in the Middle Sector, the indications
are that the momentum of the talks has flagged in the more difficult
Western Sector. The political leadership in New Delhi and Beijing
must intervene to prevent it from reaching an impasse. More fundamentally,
the Vajpayee visit to China must result in the identification
of a set of principles for the resolution of the boundary dispute
itself. This is not beyond the diplomatic grasp of New Delhi and
Beijing.
In
1988, Rajiv Gandhi released Sino-Indian relations from being a
hostage to the boundary dispute and created a framework for negotiations
on the border.
In
1993, Mr. Narasimha Rao moved the ties forward and got an agreement
to maintain "peace and tranquillity" on the border.
A decade later, Mr. Vajpayee has an opportunity to identify the
elements of a potential settlement of the boundary dispute and
transform the Himalayas into a zone of "trade and prosperity".
If the Chinese are ready to play ball, Mr. Vajpayee should grab
it with both hands. - The Hindu
