Respected Think Tank Lambasts
Musharraf Over Misleading Reforms
Special
SAT Report
ISLAMABAD:
A damning indictment of the Musharraf Government and the Pakistan
military has been handed over by an international think tank,
the International Crisis Group (ICG), over efforts of the army
to devolve political power at the grassroots level, one of the
main slogans of the military regime.
In
a report released last week, the ICG minced no words in stating
that the Musharraf reforms, "far from enhancing democracy,
have strengthened military rule and may actually raise the risks
of internal conflict."
"Devolution,
in fact, has proved little more than a cover for further centralized
control over the lower levels of government," it said.
Pakistan's
military government launched a campaign for political devolution
in 2000 that it said was aimed at transferring administrative
and financial power to local governments. The scheme was to strengthen
local control and accountability and, according to President Pervez
Musharraf, "empower the impoverished".
In
practice, however, the ICG report said, it has undercut established
political parties and drained power away from the provinces while
doing little to minimize corruption or establish clear accountability
at a local level. The reforms, far from enhancing democracy, have
strengthened military rule and may actually raise the risks of
internal conflict.
Under the Devolution of Power Plan
announced in August 2000, local governments were to be elected
on a non-party basis in phased voting between December 2000 and
July 2001. District and sub-district governments have since been
installed in 101 districts, including four cities. Operating under
its respective provincial Local Government Ordinance 2001, each
has its Nazim and Naib Nazim (mayor and deputy mayor), elected
council and administration.
Like previous local government plans,
Musharraf's called for re-establishing elected local councils
at district and sub-district levels. It promised substantial autonomy
for elected local officials and, most notably, placed an elected
official as overall head of district administration, management
and development, reversing a century-old system that subordinated
elected politicians to bureaucrats.
Musharraf's
scheme ostensibly aimed at establishing the foundations of genuine
local democracy. However, the main rationale for devolution was
and remains regime legitimacy and survival.
Aside
from the widespread allegations of rigging and manipulation that
have shadowed them, the non-partisan nature of the local elections
has exacerbated ethnic, caste and tribal divisions and undermined
the organizational coherence of political parties.
The report said: "Despite the rhetoric from Islamabad of
empowerment, local governments have only nominal powers. Devolution
from the center directly to the local levels, moreover, negates
the normal concept of decentralization since Pakistan's principal
federal units, its four provinces, have been bypassed.
The
misuse of local government officials during the April 2002 presidential
referendum and the October 2002 general elections has left little
doubt that these governments were primarily instituted to create
a pliant political elite that could help root the military's power
in local politics and displace its traditional civilian adversaries.
Friction is growing between various
levels of government, especially since the military transferred
power, at least formally, to the central and provincial governments
that were formed after the 2002 elections. These tensions are
partly the result of the manner in which the devolution plan was
devised and implemented in the absence of elected officials and
against the strong opposition of the major political parties,
civil society and media.
Despite
its lack of domestic legitimacy, the devolution plan has considerable
support from donors, who mistakenly believe it is advancing democracy
and building down military rule.
For
now, the military's backing as well as this external support works
in its favor. But low domestic acceptance undermines its long-term
prospects, and the military's political engineering that accompanies
it is widening divisions at the local and provincial levels. Some
of these could well lead to greater domestic violence and instability.
In
its recommendations to the
Government of Pakistan the ICG report said:
1. Demonstrate a commitment to real
political devolution by:
(a) placing the Local Government
Ordinance (LGO) before each provincial government for review to
create the necessary political acceptance of the scheme;
(b) holding local government elections
on a party basis, with direct polls for district officials; and
(c) refraining from imposing political
discipline on local officials and misusing them for political
ends such as partisan electioneering.
2.
Take steps toward decentralization from federal to provincial
levels by:
(a) reducing the number of federal
ministries involved in and hence capable of exercising control
over local government; and
(b) allowing the representation and
participation of provincial and national assembly legislators
in key local government bodies such as the district development
advisory committees.
3. Devolve administrative and fiscal
powers to local units, in particular by:
(a) giving district governments greater
control over budgetary resources and increasing allocations for
development, especially in poorer districts; and
(b) linking provincial population-based
fiscal transfers to each district's level of poverty, fiscal and
development needs.
4. Improve the delivery of justice
in local government through security sector reform, notably by:
(a)
expediting the formation and operationalization of district, provincial
and national safety commissions and police complaints authorities;
and
(b) allocating more resources and
staff to the district police.
To UNDP, the international financial
institutions and key donor governments, including the U.S.:
5. Encourage the Pakistan government
strongly to devolve political, administrative and financial responsibilities
to the provinces.
6.
Re-evaluate and reorder devolution program assistance in order
to emphasize sustained help for wider institutional reforms that
address the longstanding problems of poverty, economic growth,
public sector corruption and inefficiency.
7.
Link support for devolution to progress on police reforms and
provide budgetary support and other assistance to improve service
incentives and conditions and build capacity for investigation
and prosecution functions.
