A
Karachi eveninger on sale after London blasts
London
Bombings and Pakistani Connection: A Pakistani View
By
Husain Haqqani
WASHINGTON,
July 20: The July 7 terrorist bombings in London have led to greater
scrutiny of Pakistan’s role in fomenting global Jihad. The
London bombers were Britons of Pakistani origin and at least three
out of the four visited Pakistan recently. It is natural for the
international community to wonder why so many elements of Islamist
extremism have a Pakistani connection.
Pakistan’s
pro-US ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, has responded to the London
attacks by ordering a crackdown on extremist groups. Pakistan’s
suave diplomats, western educated technocrats and articulate generals
can be expected over the next few days to highlight their government’s
cooperation in the war against terrorism since Musharraf abandoned
support for Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in 2001.
The
main theme of the Pakistani establishment’s argument has
already been articulated by Mr. Munir Akram, Pakistan permanent
representative of the United Nations. Mr. Akram told the BBC that
the UK “should try not to blame foreign countries for influencing
the London suicide bombers” and that “Britain had
to look at its own problems to understand the root causes of terror.”
According to the Pakistani UN ambassador, “You have to look
at British society - what you are doing to the Muslim community
and why the Muslim community is not integrating into British society,...
and not try to externalize the problems Britain faces with regard
to race and religious relations.”
Of
course, Mr. Akram’s argument fails to explain why other
communities in Britain subjected to racism or discrimination have
not turned to terrorism and why the argument about not externalizing
domestic problems should not apply to Pakistan.
For
decades, Pakistan’s aloof bureaucratic rulers have blamed
everyone but themselves for Pakistan’s problems. “The
British role in partition was unfair, leaving the unfinished business
of Kashmir that Pakistan has had to resolve through Jihad; The
US did not assist Pakistan in achieving a decisive victory against
India in the 1965 war; The Indians divided Pakistan in 1971 and
the Americans did nothing to save the country’s unity; Sectarianism
in Pakistan is the result of the Iranian revolution; The Taliban
rose to power because the Americans lost interest in Afghanistan;
Extremism in Pakistan is the result of Pakistan’s crucial
role in the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan.” Etcetera.
Etcetera.
Perhaps
it is time for Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy to wake up to
its own mistakes and face its own history, instead of constant
spin. The Muslim League’s failure to win over Shaikh Abdullah
before partition probably contributed more to depriving Pakistan
of Jammu and Kashmir than did the inequities of the British, who
partitioned India in a hurry.
Pakistan’s
generals made enormous miscalculations while blundering into the
1965 war and should have known that the US would not come to their
rescue. The arrogance of Pakistan’s military-intelligence
combine and the mistreatment of Pakistan’s then majority
population, the Bengalis, led to the creation of Bangladesh.
Pakistan’s
unpopular rulers chose to encourage sectarianism in an effort
to contain the potential of popular support for the Iranian revolution.
Pakistan’s
role in Afghanistan was a conscious decision of the country’s
establishment but the establishment failed to match its ambitions
with competence.
It
is time for Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy to face its cumulative
mistakes and start addressing the culture of blame and prejudice
that has been part of officially sponsored discourse in the country.
Of course, Pakistan has legitimate security interests and must
pursue these with intelligent diplomacy. But the policies of constant
invoking of religion in affairs of state, unconventional warfare
against neighbors as a means of containing their power, and duality
in dealing with the west have failed and that failure must now
be accepted.
Pakistanis
cannot go around seeking western aid in return for strategic cooperation
while hating the west at the same time.
There
is no doubt that Musharraf has selectively cooperated with the
United States and other western governments since 9/11 and Pakistan
has made some high profile Al-Qaeda arrests. But Pakistan has
yet to acknowledge, let alone deal with, the ideology of hatred
and militancy that has been cultivated as state policy for over
four decades.
The
threat of terrorism to the west does not come exclusively from
Arabs formally affiliated with Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda,
whom the Pakistan government has done much to pursue. Other groups
organized to “avenge” real and perceived humiliation
of Muslims are an equally significant menace, operating as “baby
Al-Qaedas.” Afghan, Kashmiri and Pakistani Islamist groups
share Al-Qaeda's ideology even when they have no direct links
to bin Laden's network.
Some
of Pakistan’s madrassas are no longer just bastions of medieval
theology, which they were for centuries without giving rise to
terrorism. They have evolved into training centers for radical
anti-Western militancy. Pakistan’s school curriculum cultivates
the sentiment of Muslim victimhood and inculcates in young minds
the hatred of Jews and Hindus, in particular, and non-Muslims
in general.
When
it emerged as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan was considered
a moderate Muslim nation that could serve as a model for other
emerging independent Muslim states. Pakistan’s founder,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a Shia Muslim. Its first law minister
was a Hindu. Its foreign minister belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect,
which opposes Jihad. Although Pakistan’s birth was accompanied
by religious riots and communal violence, the country’s
founders clearly intended to create a non-sectarian state that
would protect religious freedoms and provide the Muslims of South
Asia an opportunity to live in a country where they constituted
a majority.
Over
the years, however, Pakistan has become a major center of Islamist
extremism. The disproportionate influence wielded by fundamentalist
groups in Pakistan is the result of state sponsorship of such
groups.
Pakistan’s
rulers have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of
strengthening Pakistan’s identity since soon after the country’s
inception. Fears of Indian domination were addressed by embracing
an Islamist ideology. Islamist militants were cultivated, armed
and trained during the 1980s and 1990s in the Pakistan military’s
efforts to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure
on India for negotiations over the future of Kashmir. Although
Musharraf has restrained some of these home-grown groups since
9/11, he has refused to work towards eliminating them completely.
In
an effort to justify the ascendancy of Pakistan’s military
in the country’s affairs, a national ethos of militarism
was created. An environment dominated by Islamist and militarist
ideologies is the ideal breeding ground for radicals such as the
July 7 suicide bombers. In their search for identity, British-born
Pakistanis have been drawn into the whirlpool of their parents’
homeland.
The
United States and other western nations have put their faith in
the promises of General Musharraf’s military to move Pakistan
away from its Islamist radical past and towards “enlightened
moderation.” But the London attacks point out the deep-rooted
problems in Pakistan.
The
major Kashmiri Jihadi groups retain their infrastructure because
the Pakistani military has not decided to give up the option of
battling India at a future date. Afghanistan’s Taliban also
continue to find safe haven in parts of Pakistan as recently as
the spring of 2005.
Western
policy makers would rather see Pakistan’s glass as half
full rather than half empty and Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy
would like to keep things that way. This approach distracts Pakistan’s
rulers, and their western supporters, from recognizing the depth
of Pakistan’s problem with Islamist extremism and a violently
irresponsible attitude towards the rest of the world.
The
writer is author of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
book “Pakistan Between Mosque and Military.” He was
Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka from 1992 to 1993 and
teaches International Relations at Boston University
